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Summary: 1. The changing image and structure of international law – 2. The 
exercise of public authority through delegation – 3. The question of state immunity 
in the context of hybridisation between public and private – 4. The content of the 
activity as a paradigm to guide the extension of state immunity – 5. The issue of 
limiting the immunity of delegated non state actors - 6. Conclusions 
 
 
1. The changing image and structure of international law  
 
Years ago, the former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
Judge Higgins, affirmed that “international law has to be identified by reference to 
what the actors (most often states) […] believe normative in their relations with 
                                                        
* Though the contribution is an overall joint effort of the authors, par. 1, 5 and 6 are authored 
by Alberto Oddenino and par. 2,3,4 and 6 are authored by Diego Bonetto. 
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each other”. 2  Understanding the evolution of contemporary international law 
necessarily requires us to consider the role played by various actors with reference 
to the structure and the contents of international law.  
In this regard, the traditional picture of international law describes states as 
the “normal types” of legal persons and the primary subjects of the international 
community.3 However, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual 
reshaping of this idea together with that of international society4.  
The first sign of this evolution was the development of intergovernmental 
organisations that, at an early stage, were essentially instruments of states’ 
collective action, lacking international legal personality.5 Later, after the Second 
World War, with the birth of the United Nations and the creation of new 
intergovernmental organisations, the new institutions became more autonomous 
and acquired their own obligations and rights.6 The post-war period witnessed as 
well the phenomena of “fragmentation” and “informalization” of the newly formed 
international governmental organisations (IGOs). As Benvenisti pointed out these 
phenomena have been a by-product of the tendency of states to “ensure that IGOs 
remain subservient to their interests, but also to avoid broad, integrative agreements 
whenever possible and opt for a large number of narrow agreements that are 
                                                        
2 R. HIGGINS, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p. 18. 
3 J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.116; 
A. CASSESE, International Law, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.72; W. FRIEDMANN, The 
Changing Structure of International Law, Columbia University Press, 1964, p.67, quoting P. JESSUP, 
A Modern Law of Nations, 1948. 
4 See generally, A. CASSESE, supra (2), pp.22-45; the processes of mutation taking place at the 
international level are characterised by different patterns – like the absence of a unitary sovereign – 
that make such processes happening at a slower pace if compared to the ones happening within 
national borders, on this point see A. PELLET, L’adaptation du droit international aux besoins 
changeants de la société internationale, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law, Vol. 329, 2007, p. 18. 
5 See e.g. The International Institute for Agriculture set up in 1905 or the various River Commissions 
(for the Rhine and Danube); see also Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube 
Between Galatz and Braila, France, and others v Romania, Advisory Opinion, 1927, PCIJ, (Series 
B) No 14, ICGJ 281. 
6 A. CASSESE, ‘States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International Community’, 
in B. FASSBENDER, A. PETERS (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p.66; Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949, ICJ Rep 174.  
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functionally defined […] and circumscribe [IGOs] authority whenever its creation 
is unavoidable”7. 
Then, in the last decades, technological and commercial developments have 
changed the way in which international affairs are managed. Such a change has 
taken place in order to face what Dominicé defined one of the major challenges of 
our time; i.e. the necessity of advancing global coordinated responses to global 
problems that cannot find solutions at the national level8. 
In this regard, due to the emergence and growing influence of new entities 
at the international level, including private international corporations performing 
cross-borders activities, the original structure of international law has started to be 
challenged by what is generally referred to as global governance or transnational 
law. This latter term, for instance, first coined by Philip Jessup in 1956, has been 
used in order to describe the law that transcends or crosses borders and that it is not 
necessarily created and enacted by states9.  
The new phenomena described by global governance have paved the way 
for the appearance of new entities known as ‘non-state actors’ in international legal 
scholarship.10 This notion includes all those actors in international relations that are 
not states: international organisations, individuals, international corporations, non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and even transnational criminal 
organisations.11 From a legal perspective, the evolution of international relations in 
a more transnational dimension and the emergence of new actors have certainly 
questioned the traditional legal framework based on state-made sources like treaties 
and custom. The presence of new entities and their impact in the regulation of cross-
border affairs have led to the softening of international law instruments previously 
conceived only in formalistic terms. This is mainly due to the rise of new fields of 
                                                        
7 E. BENVENISTI, The Law of Global Governance, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, Vol. 368, 2013, p. 74. 
8 C. DOMINICÉ, La société internationale à la recherce de son équilibre, Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 370, 2013, p. 32. 
9 See generally C. MENKEL-MEADOW, ‘Why and How to study Transnational Law’, UC Irvine Law 
Review, Vol.1 No.1, 2001, pp. 97-129.  [] 
10 H. THIRLWAY, The Sources of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.17. 
11 M. WAGNER, ‘Non-State Actors’, in R. WOLFRUM (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.1. 
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global activities such as international trade, food, health and environment 
regulation12.   
In this regard, some scholars have expressed the necessity of a complete 
rethinking of the doctrine of sources of international law, as the traditional version 
is now considered outdated and inadequate13. One proposition intends to highlight 
the so-called “effect- (or impact-) based” conception of international law 
ascertainment, according to which “in today’s globalised world what matters is 
whether and how the subjects of norms, rules, and standards come to accept those 
norms”14. In other words, these normative systems can be considered law based on 
their authoritative value. In this sense, especially in the context of regulatory bodies 
that are not considered lawmakers in the traditional sense, certain rules become law 
since they permit the exercise of authority by the actors involved in that particular 
regulation15.  
As a consequence, the new articulations of international relations have led 
legal scholarship to reconsider the historically narrow scope of international law - 
conceiving law as a synonym of government - as increasingly expanding its space 
of action and turned their attention to the relationship between law and 
globalisation16. On this subject, it has been suggested that the shift from government 
to governance in the production of law - caused by processes of globalisation and 
the consequent vertical extension of international law as to include multiple actors 
                                                        
12 On the softening of international law see P.M.DUPUY, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the 
Environment’, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.12, 1991, pp. 420-435. For a social 
science-oriented perspective to soft law see A.T. GUZMAN and T. MEYER, Soft Law, in E. 
KONTOROVICH and F. PARISI (eds.), Economic Analysis of International Law, Elgar Publishing, 2016 
12 H.THIRLWAY, supra (7), p. 199. A more cautious position can be found in J. D’ASPREMONT and, 
“Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials,” The European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, no. 5, 2008. 
13 H.THIRLWAY, supra (7), p. 199. 5, 2008. 
14 J. KLABBERS, ‘Law-Making and Constitutionalism’, in J. KLABBERS, A. PETERS, G. ULFSTEIN 
(eds.), The Constitutionalization of Interantional Law, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.98. 
15 On the informal law-making role of private institutions (PIs) that, notwithstanding the “soft” 
nature of their acts, produce de facto binding norms, see BENVENISTI, The Law of Global 
Governance, p. 89: private institutions “actually possess means to set and enforce standards that are 
binding de facto due to the market share of the PI members. The PIs do not seek formally binding 
norms, because they do not need legal formality to make their standards widely effective.” 
16 P. BERMAN, ‘From International Law to Law and Globalisation’, Journal of Transnational Law, 
2004-2005, pp. 485-556; S. CASSESE, ‘The Globalization of Law’, International Law and Politics, 
Vol.37, 2006, pp. 973-993. 
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other than states – has led to the emergence of informal international law-making 
processes as an alternative to more traditional normative schemes.17  
Such vertical extension of international law, along with the ever-increasing 
recourse to informal and soft-law-making processes, brought about reflections on 
the nature of international law and, in particular, on the boundaries between its 
public and private domains. Indeed, as already argued by Kelsen, the idea that some 
matters ought to be attributed to private ordering while others would need to be the 
object of public law is deeply political18. The issue of the public/private divide has 
been addressed, from different perspectives, by the American critical legal studies 
and part of the feminist scholarship who maintained that such a divide enables and 
perpetuates relationships of dominance by relegating them to the private realm.19 
This debate has led some of these authors to question the significance and the role 
of the public/private divide. 
The “publicness” of public international law has been understood for a long 
time as a feature proper of the subjects of international law, i.e. the states, which 
are deemed as the public institution par excellence. Hence, the publicness of public 
international law was not necessarily associated to the exercise of authority. The 
absence of this latter has in many cases been identified as a defining feature of the 
international system in which sovereign states co-exist and interact on the base of 
consent: a dimension closer to the private law paradigm20.  
However, as pointed out by some authors, the development of international 
legal order has also been influenced by the emergence of common, supranational 
and even global challenges. Sophisticated institutional structures, aimed at the 
fulfilment of common and global interests, have appeared with shapes and 
                                                        
17 R. WESSEL, J. PAUWELYN, J. WOUTERS, Informal International Law-Making, Oxford University 
Press, 2012, at 1. 
18 H. KELSEN, Pure Theory of Law, (2nd edn., tr. by Max Knight, 1967), pp. 281-284.  
19 D. KENNEDY, ‘The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction’, 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 1981-1982, pp. 1352; and N. FRASER, Unruly Practices: Power, 
Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
20  See amongst many L. OPPENHEIM, International Law. A Treatise, 1905; J. WESTLAKE, 
International Law, 1904; more recently P. WEIL, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International 
Law?’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, 1983, pp. 441; K. DOEHRING, ‘Democracy 
and International Law’, in S. YEE and E. MC WHINNEY MORIN (eds), Multiculturalism and 
International Law, 2009, pp. 199-205. 
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functioning that are quite far from the image of an international order based on 
horizontal relations informed by state consent21. Moreover, some authors stressed 
the importance of the identification of general interests that are proper of the 
international community.22 Thus, if on the one hand international law has witnessed 
an increasing emergence of non-state and private subjects, on the other hand the 
international legal order has acquired – at least with regard to some aspects – a 
“publicness” related no longer to the subjective element, but to the nature of the 
processes informed to common interests and confronted with the issue of 
legitimacy.23  
At the same time, the nature and the role of private international law has 
profoundly mutated as well. While its traditional space used to be at the outskirts 
of the national legal orders with the purpose of delineating their reciprocal 
boundaries, private international law acquired a more central role. As pointed out 
by Basedow, private international law still embodies the function of delineating 
domestic borders, but it has also become the “key to the private law of global home 
affairs in a multi-jurisdictional world”24. 
The public/private divide is hardly identifiable with clearcut distinctions 
between domains or activities. The criticisms mentioned before apply to the 
replication of the divide within the international domain. Indeed, notwithstanding 
the mutating actors and their dynamics of interaction at the international level, 
international law still reflects a very traditional view of the role of the state. As 
Chinkin points out, its claim “to universal applicability assumes a commonly 
accepted rationale for distinguishing between the conduct of state organs and that 
                                                        
21 N. KRISCH, International ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public 
Goods’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 108, 2014, p. 1; and A. BOGDANDY, M. 
GOLDMANN, I. WENZKE, ‘From Public International Law to International Public Law: Translating 
World Public Opinion into International Public Authority’, MPIL Research Paper Series, No. 2016-
02, pp. 5-6. 
22 See for example G. GAJA, The Protection of General Interests in the International Community, 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 364, 2012, p. 20. 
23 BOGDANDY, GOLDMANN, WENZKE, ‘From Public International Law to International Public Law’, 
p. 5. 
24  J. BASEDOW, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation of 
International Relations, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 360, 
2012, p. 35. 
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of other entities, which in fact depends upon philosophical convictions about the 
proper role of government and government intervention”25. The demarcation of the 
public and private spheres is in many instances culturally specific, rendering the 
adoption of western analytical tools to understand the international regime 
questionable26. 
Such concerns were already raised by some national governments in the 
occasion of the revision of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the 
International Law Commission conducted by the Special Rapporteur James 
Crawford 27 . For instance, Germany questioned whether the fact that states 
increasingly entrust persons outside the apparatus of state organs with tasks 
normally attributable to a state was sufficiently taken into account, and suggested 
that the assumption of governmental functions is rooted in the past rather than in 
present conditions. On the same matter, the United Kingdom raised the doubt on 
the possibility of effectively defining what constitutes governmental functions 
within the Draft Articles given that there is no shared understanding of the 
concept.28  
Thus, the character of the public/private dichotomy and the “publicness” of 
public international law are challenged by the undergoing mutations of the 
international legal order. Nonetheless, they cannot be wiped out of the conceptual 
framework of international law as they still constitute a paradigm loaded of 
important consequences. They need to be analysed in the light of the current 
international system because, as Jouannet pointed out, even the more “liberal” 
international law – the contemporary international law of co-ordination structured 
on the private law paradigm – is not based on sovereign equality alone, but on 
democracy and human rights as well.29 Hence, it appears that the characters of 
                                                        
25 C. CHINKIN, “A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension”, European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 390. 
26 H. CHARLESWORTH, ‘Worlds Apart: Public/Private Distinctions in International Law’, in M. 
THORNTON (ed.), Public and Private Feminist Legal Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996, p. 251. 
27 First Report presented by the Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, to the ILC at its 50th session 
in 1998; UN Doc. A/CN.4/490, 24 April 1998, with addenda. 
28 On the matter see also CHINKIN, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, p. 389. 
29 E. JOUANNET, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations, 2012, pp. 205-215. 
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international law and of public international law might be multifarious and are to 
be searched not just in the nature of the actors but also in operations that they 
undertake.  
This leads to the issue of immunity, a traditional domain of substantive 
international law where nature of the actors and nature of the activity are of the 
utmost relevance. The main aim of this contribution is to investigate the way 
immunity is affected by this evolution of international law and how immunity 
should be framed with reference to private actors exercising public authority. The 
investigation will introduce the concept of delegation of public authority, in the 
context of hybridisation between public and private, focusing then on the content 
of the activity as a paradigm to guide the extension of state immunity, through a 
presumption of non applicability . The analysis of some relevant national case-law, 
and of a pending case in front of the ECJ will serve as support of the analysis for 
testing its contentions.   
 
 
2. The exercise of public authority through delegation 
 
The notion of public authority can also be analysed from the different 
perspective of delegation. Indeed, the focus here is the concept of governmental 
authority, namely the authority exercised by states as an expression of their 
authoritative powers. In this context, the hybridisation between public and private 
occurs when a state chooses to delegate to a private actor an activity that the state 
was originally entitled to perform. From an international law perspective, the 
relevance of this practice resides in the fact that the delegated activity is generally 
considered as a prerogative of states.  
This is a general principle shared by most national legal systems. For 
instance, in the United States the rule against delegation provides that authorities 
with governmental power are to exercise such power themselves without delegating 
it to other entities. However, as Lanham explains in his article on the delegation of 
governmental power to private parties, “the rule is by no means absolute, but it is 
likely to be applied with greater vigour where power is delegated to private parties 
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than where the delegation is to an official party.” 30  The transfer of formerly 
governmental responsibilities to the private sector has become increasingly popular 
in the last decades. The rationale behind delegation is the promise of greater 
efficiency, lower costs along with the avoidance of legal entanglements 
characterising government.  
As Lawrence points out, the debate over delegation of governmental power 
to private entities has mostly been political in nature. “Indeed, when privatization 
involves governmental functions, the legal issues are largely secondary, involving 
only details. But if [it] involves governmental powers, the legal problems become 
considerably more formidable”31.  
The exercise of governmental power, in general, and the delegation of such 
power to private entities, in particular, inevitably raises the issue of determining 
which powers are governmental and which are not. Most powers and functions 
exercised by a government could be undertaken by private actors32. Nonetheless, 
some powers have been identified as essentially governmental: rulemaking, 
adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, licensing and taxation. 33 
Common to these powers is the element of coercion that is uniquely based on the 
public authority. Whereas such powers, when exercised by private actors, are 
generally based on consent (contract) or ownership of property.34 
The term delegation has been defined as a “transfer of authority, whereby 
the exercise of power is conveyed from a governmental actor to a private entity in 
such a way as to confer the private delegate a degree of legitimacy of action”.35 
                                                        
30 D. LANHAM, ‘Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties’, Otago Law Review, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, 1985, pp. 51-60. 
31 D. M. LAWRENCE, ‘Private Exercise of Governmental Power’, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 61, 
1986, p. 647. 
32  Ellickson provides an analysis of the parallel between municipalities and homeowners’ 
associations (see R. ELLICKSON, ‘Cities and Homeowners associations’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 1982, p. 1519). 
33  On the matter of the governmental or private character of state activities see Sonntag v. 
Waidmann and others, 21 April 1993, C-172/91, par 21. 
34 For a deeper analysis on this matter see LAWRENCE, ‘Private Exercise of Governmental Power’, 
p. 648. 
35  C. M. DONNELLY, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties, A Comparative 
Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 3. 
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This means that the external private actor that exercises authority is authorized to 
do so by an act issued by a delegating public body that is originally entitled to 
exercise that authority. Abbott, Snidal, Slaughter and others offer a definition that 
looks at the consequences of the transfer, according to which delegation consists in 
a grant of authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules and, interestingly, 
“possibly make further rules”.36 Inserire necessità di minimo di discrezionalità e 
non solo valutazioni tecniche 
A good example that illustrates the process of delegating governmental 
authority is represented by the outsourcing of security activities to private military 
contractors. These private corporations are often used by states in armed conflict, 
prolonged military occupation, peacekeeping, and territorial administration in post-
conflict institutional building and intelligence gathering. 37  Other examples of 
delegation of governmental power are that of airline companies, which exercise 
functions of immigration control, or private companies running detention facilities. 
The increasing number and diversity of private actors empowered to 
exercise elements of governmental authority through delegation is raising the level 
of difficulty in the elaboration of a criterion to identify them. They operate in many 
different areas, and different are also the legal systems by which they are regulated. 
As pointed out by Momtaz, “if it is true that the common characteristic of these 
entities is that they enjoy a legal personality separate from that of the State, this 
does not mean that their other characteristics are not highly diverse”38. According 
to the International Law Commission (ILC), there are some factors that may be 
considered as reliable indicators for the attribution of the behaviour of such private 
entities to the state, but they are not alone sufficient. These may be: the participation 
of the State in the capital of private entities, or the level of control exercised by the 
State over their activities. The ILC maintained that “the most appropriate solution 
is to refer to the real common feature which these entities have: namely that they 
                                                        
36 K. ABBOTT AND OTHERS, ‘The Concept of Legalization’, International Organization, Vol. 54 
No.3, 2000, pp.401-419.  
37 See generally F. FRANCIONI, N. RONZITTI, War by Contract, Human Rights, Humanitarian Law 
and Private Contractors, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
38 D. MOMTAZ, O ‘Attribution of conduct to the State: State Organs and Entities Empowered to 
Exercise Elements of Governmental Authority’, in J. CRAWFORD, A. PELLET AND S. OLLESON (eds), 
The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 244. 
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are empowered, if only exceptionally and to a limited extent, to exercise specified 
functions which are akin to those normally exercised by organs of the State”.39  
Moreover, as pointed out by Abbott, Snidal, Slaughter and others, 
delegation opens the exercise of governmental power to new actors and new forms 
of politics in international relations. In particular, private actors with delegated 
governmental authority are likely to have their own interests, which are constrained 
more or less successfully by conditions imposed on the grant of authority and 
surveillance 40 . All these aspects raise the problem of understanding the link 
between the delegated private actor and the State. This is particularly relevant from 
an international law perspective as it raises many concerns also with reference to 
the scope of application of immunity, as it will now be investigated.  
 
 
3. The question of state immunity in the context of hybridisation between 
public and private 
 
The hybridisation between public and private has relevant impact on the 
application of public international law norms. Indeed, the uncertainty in discerning 
public and private often brings confusion when the application of traditional 
international law norms comes into play. Focusing on the  norm on the jurisdictional 
immunity of states, such a norm is intended as an essential part of the recognition 
of state sovereignty, as well as an aspect of the (formal) legal equality of states and 
their duty of non-interference. 41  The recognition of foreign states’ sovereign 
powers operates as a protection for the exclusivity of those activities that are 
considered to be an exercise of public authority. In this sense, since the regulation 
of the social life of the state, namely the exercise of public authority, corresponds 
                                                        
39 Commentary to draft art. 7, para 18: Report of the ILC, 26th Session, ILC yearbook 1974, Vol 
II(1), p. 282. 
40 ABBOTT AND OTHERS, ‘The Concept of Legalization’, p. 418: “Deciding disputes, adapting or 
developing new rules, implementing agreed norms, and responding to rule violations all engender 
their own type of politics, which helps to restructure traditional interstate politics”. 
41 M. SHAW, International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 697; the legal institution of 
immunity is grounded on the international law principle “par in parem non habet imperium” 
confirmed in the relative case law, see for instance Mahamdia v. Algeria, Judgement of 19 July 
2012, C-154/11.  
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to the emanation of public acts, the state has the right to have those acts recognised 
by other states, on the ground that they express a prerogative contemplated by 
international law. 42  Therefore, international law facilitates the performance of 
public functions by states and their representatives by providing immunity should 
they be sued or prosecuted in foreign courts. The law on state immunity in fact 
precludes the courts of the forum state from exercising adjudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction in certain cases in which a foreign state is a party. It is 
therefore clear that the central question here is the possibility of extending the 
application of the norm on state immunity to actors that although separate from the 
state, are authorised or delegated to exercise elements of public authority.  
As maintained by Peters, “immunities are a messy affair”.43 The complexity 
of this matter can be sensed throughout its history that see immunities been treated 
as a matter of “mere grace, comity, or usage”.44 The judgement of the US Supreme 
Court, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, is treated as the first judicial decision on 
the issue of immunity globally. In the case, the Court granted immunity to a French 
public/national military vessel as “a matter of grace and comity”.45 
This view of immunity can still be found in countries that paradoxically 
undertook a greater effort of codification of the matter in domestic statues. Notably, 
countries of the common law tradition, whereby domestic statute law often 
constitutes the primary or even the sole legal basis for judgements concerning 
immunity. An example is represented by the judgement Samantar v. Yousuf in 
which there was no mention whatsoever to international law. The only legal basis 
referenced were the American Foreign Policy Act and the policy of the State 
Department.46 
The legal nature of immunity was confirmed in 2012 by the judgement of 
the ICJ, which affirmed that the application of immunity is a requirement of 
                                                        
42  R. LUZZATTO, I. QUEIROLO, ‘Sovranità territoriale, jurisdiction e regole di immunità’, in 
CARBONE AND OTHERS (eds.), Istitutzioni di Diritto Internazionale, Giappichelli, 2011, p.  240. 
43 A. PETERS, “Immune Against Constitutionalisation?”, in A. PETERS, E. LAGRANGE, S. OETER, and 
C. TOMUSCHAT, Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014, p. 1. 
44  L. DAMROSCH, “Changing International Law of Sovereign Immunity Through National 
Decisions”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, No. 44, 2001, p. 1186. 
45 US Supreme Court, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, judgment of 24 February 1812, 11 us (7 
Cranch) 116–147. 
46 US Supreme Court., Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yousuf et al., 1 June 2010, 560. 
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international law, and that “whether in claiming immunity for themselves or 
according it to others, states generally proceed on the basis that there is a right to 
immunity under international law, together with a corresponding obligation on the 
part of other states to respect and give effect to that immunity”.47 
Immunities appear a particularly interesting and important institution to 
observe the mutations of international law. In particular, state immunity constitutes 
a reflection of the structure of the international legal order. As affirmed Lady Hazel 
Fox, any “study of state immunity directs attention to the central issues of the 
international legal system. […] Ultimately the extent to which international law 
requires, and municipal legislations and courts afford, immunity to a foreign state 
depends on the underlying structure of the international community”.48 For these 
reasons, this contribution focuses on the extension of state immunity to private 
actors, whose role in the international arena is gaining momentum.  
Immunity is, “after all, an outgrowth of the Westphalian interstate system 
based on coordination and cooperation among equal sovereigns”. 49  From the 
international law perspective, immunities (be them of states, state officials, or 
international organizations) are meant to protect the legal order, the stability of 
international relations, inter-state cooperation, and secure the discharge of public 
functions of the relevant actors.50 However, the function of immunities, and in 
particular of state immunity, would be frustrated if applied beyond its rationale. 
Indeed, as El Sawah argues, immunity should not be granted “au-delà de sa 
veritable justification” 51  in order to prevent its degeneration into forms of 
privileges, unjustifiable in the contemporary international legal order. Thus, 
provided that private actors are assuming increasing importance in the international 
scene, often undertaking functions formerly exercised by states, how should 
immunity relate to these emerging situations? 
                                                        
47 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), judgment of 3 
February 2012, icj Reports 2012, para. 56. 
48 H. FOX and F. WEBB, The Law of State Immunity, Oxford: Oxford University Press (3d ed.), 2013, 
p. 7. 
49 PETERS, “Immune Against Constitutionalisation?”, p. 2. 
50 Ibid., p. 17. 
51 S. EL SAWAH, Les immunités de l’Etat et des organisations internationales: immunités et procès 
équitable, Bruxelles: Larcier, 2012, para. 22. 
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The American doctrine and jurisprudence have started to conceive a new 
form of immunity called derivative immunity, enjoyed by private actors when acting 
in concert with sovereign states.52 This extension of immunity is intended to be 
applied to private corporations and contractors effectively operating “in the shoes 
of the sovereign”.53  It is therefore essential to investigate to what extent state 
immunity can operate beyond its traditional scope.  
State practice is not uniform when considering if “other entities”, namely 
entities distinct from the state, can enjoy immunity by default. UK law, for instance, 
adopts a presumption of non-immunity in these cases. 54  This is the approach 
adopted in the Trendtex case in which it was observed that a court before which the 
issue of immunity arises has the responsibility of examining “all the relevant 
circumstances”.55 In the decision, the tribunal held that the bank at stake had a status 
outside the government and separate from it, and was a mere agent not entrusted 
with any executive powers.56  The presumption of non-immunity is clear when 
reading the State Immunity Act which, in defining a foreign state, does not include 
separate entities.57 In the Tsavliris case, the tribunal had to establish if the Grain 
Board of Iraq, an entity with independent legal personality, was a department of the 
Iraqi Ministry of Trade. The entity was involved in a dispute on the ownership of a 
cargo of wheat on a ship. The tribunal concluded that the body was a “separate 
entity” having its own legal personality, along with financial and administrative 
independence, and thus not eligible to invoke state immunity.58 The court then 
                                                        
52 J. BALZANO, ‘A Hidden Compromise: Qualified Immunity in Suits Against Foreign Governmental 
Officials’, Oregon Review of International Law, Vol, 13, 2011, p. 88.  
53 Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, US Maryland District Court, 2010, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702.  
54 YANG X., State Immunity and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 232. 
55 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, England Court of Appeal, 1977, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 64, p. 147.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Section 14 UK State Immunity Act, reads as follows: “The immunities and privileges conferred 
by this Part of this Act apply to any foreign or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; 
and references to a State include references to (a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his 
public capacity; (b) the government of that State; and (C) any department of that government, but 
not to any entity (hereafter referred to as a "separate entity ") which is distinct from the executive 
organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued. 
58 Tsavliris Salvage (International) Limited v. The Grain Board of Iraq, 2008, EWHC 612, 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 90. 
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turned to analyse the activity performed by the entity and reached the same 
conclusion.  
Interesting indications can be drawn by looking at the practice of states 
without immunity legislation. The German position is that separate legal entities of 
foreign states “enjoy no immunity”.59 Thus German courts operate a preliminary 
assessment on the structure, status and activities the entity normally performs, 
insofar as its separateness from the state is considered the central question.60 In 
Central Bank of Nigeria, the Frankfurt Landgericht goes even further by saying 
that, if the entity possesses independent legal personality, can sue and be sued in its 
own name and can acquire property, there is no need to look at whether the entity 
has been designed to exercise governmental functions.61 Only when it constitutes 
an “integral instrumentality” of the state, the court has to investigate if the entity 
actually performs acta jure imperii.62 This extreme position seems to be mitigated 
in NIOC Pipeline Contracts when the court, in relation to the exercise of acta jure 
imperii, held that if the respondent was a legal person acting on a sovereign basis, 
it could have in principle enjoyed state immunity.63  
A different position seems to be held by French jurisprudence, affirmed by 
the National Iranian Gas Corporation case, which holds that foreign states, as well 
as bodies acting under their instructions or on their behalf, enjoyed jurisdictional 
immunity for acts of sovereign power (puissance public) and for acts performed in 
the interests of a public service.64 However, the separateness of the entity was 
assessed in Kuwait News Agency, a press organisation with its own legal personality 
and independent budget. The Court observed that the protected interests of the state 
                                                        
59 Central Bank of Nigeria Case, Landgericht of Frankfurt, 1976, International Law Reports, Vol. 
65, p. 131ff. 
60 NIOC Pipeline Contracts Case, Germany, 1982, International Law Reports, Vol. 65, p. 212ff and 
NIOC Legal Status Case, Germany, 1980, International Law Reports, Vol. 65, p. 199ff.   
61 Central Bank of Nigeria Case, supra  (36), p. 134. 
62 Ibid. 
63 NIOC Pipeline Contracts Case, supra (37), pp. 213-214.  
64 National Iranian Gas Corporation v. Pipeline Services and Another, Cour de Cassation, 1990, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 113, p 446ff.  
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of Kuwait justifying jurisdictional immunity could not have been infringed by the 
acte de gestion of a press agency, even if it was an “emanation of the state”.65  
As for Swiss jurisprudence, the Banco de la Nacion Lima concerned a 
dispute between a state-owned Peruvian bank and an Italian bank over attachments 
of funds held in Swiss banking institutions. The Court held that foreign state-owned 
corporations endowed with their own independent legal personality could not in 
principle invoke state immunity, unless they were performing an activity jure 
imperii. 66  Interestingly, the court expressed its position on an hypothetical 
situation: “it would hardly be equitable to authorise a bank which had close 
financial links with a foreign state to enter into competition at will with private 
banking undertakings and to conclude international financial transactions, thereby 
at the same time allowing that entity to invoke immunity”, and thus, in doing so, 
escaping the consequences of those transactions. In this case, therefore, the 
evaluation hinged on both the status of the entity and the activities performed.  
The same position was held by the Italian courts in Consorzio Agrario, but 
concentrated more on the actions involved.67 Belgian judges also considered both 
the legal personality and the contractual activity in Vaessen, when an American 
employer claimed jurisdictional immunity by virtue of an agreement between 
Belgium and the US concerning American military cemeteries managed by the 
claimant corporation.68 
Therefore, the case law illustrated here suggests that courts tend to reason 
on both the status of an entity and the activity performed. In other words, the 
possibility of granting immunity to entities separated from the state hinges on a 
double test. First, the court has to look at the constitution, structure, composition 
and financial independence of the entity; second, if the activity involves 
commercial operations, immunity shall be excluded, according to the restrictive 
                                                        
65 Kuwait News Agency v. Parrot, Cour de Cassation, 1990, International Law Reports, Vol.113, p. 
457ff. 
66 Banco de la Nacion Lima v. Banco Cattolico del Veneto, Switzerland Federal Tribunal, 1984, 
International Law Reports, Vol.82, p. 10ff.  
67 Consorzio Agrario della Tripolitania v. Federazione Italiana Consorzi Agrari and Cassa di 
Risparmio della Libia, Corte di Cassazione, 1966, International Law Reports, Vol. 65, p. 265ff.  
68 Vaessen v. American Battle Monuments Commission, Belgium Labour Court of Verviers, 1997, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 115, p. 135ff. 
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doctrine. However, it seems that in certain circumstances, the status of the entity is 
indicative of the activity performed.  Hence a corporation usually acts as a private 
body and puts in place contracts as any other private individual. Only specific 
factual circumstances may lead to an exercise of public functions and thus open the 
possibility of granting immunity. Therefore, in order to take into account all the 
relevant circumstances, the analysis of the status or personality of the entity seems 
to be necessary and, in any event, to be assessed on an ad hoc basis. 
 
 
4. The content of the activity as a paradigm to guide the extension of state 
immunity 
 
Even assuming the possibility of extending state immunity to private parties, 
it is important to establish which activities can be considered an exercise of 
governmental authority. International law deals with the identification of 
governmental authority for the ascertainment of state responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts, and in particular for the question of the attribution of 
conduct. Indeed, if conduct can be attributed to a state – including their organs and 
other entities acting on their behalf – that conduct is, in principle, suitable to be 
covered by immunity.  
For this purpose, the Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) constitute a useful tool. In particular, 
what is of interest here is when the state entrusts an external entity to perform public 
functions, as addressed by Article 5 of the ARSIWA. 69  The term “entity” is 
intended to reflect a wide variety of bodies that, though not organs, are empowered 
by the law of a state to exercise elements of governmental authority. 70  The 
                                                        
69 The cases in which a conduct is attributable to a state on the basis of a non-formal and only factual 
relationship concern the so-called ‘de facto organs’. On this aspect, see P. PALCHETTI, L’organo di 
fatto dello stato nell’illecito internazionale, Giuffrè, 2007. The author suggests a wide notion of ‘de 
facto organ’, departing from the features of direction and control contained in Article 8 ARSIWA, 
and stressing that the relationship between a state and a ‘de facto organ’ can be established by factual 
elements that transcends the internal law of the state. For a study on the term ‘organ’ see F. SALERNO, 
‘Genesi e usi della nozione di organo nella dottrina internazionalista italiana”, Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale, 2009, Vol.4, pp. 921-958. 
70 ARSIWA Commentary, Article 5, para. (3). 
 18 
ARSIWA Commentary specifies that the intention of the provision is to give 
account to the increasing privatisation of public functions, such as in the case of 
private security firms contracted as prison guards and exercising powers of 
detention and discipline; or the case of private airlines to which states delegate 
certain powers in relation to immigration control or quarantine.71  
With regard to the notion of governmental authority in particular, it has been 
noted that there is no consensus on what it constitutes, as the concept tends to 
depend on a state’s “particular society, its history and traditions”.72 However, the 
ARSIWA Commentary tries to identify a set of criteria in order to determine the 
elements of governmental authority.73 These are: (a) the content of the powers, (b) 
the manner in which they are conferred to the entity, (c) the purposes for which the 
powers are to be exercised, and (d) the extent to which the entity is publicly 
accountable for their exercise.  
Although reference to such criteria can be indicative, case law in this context 
is far from coherent. This is probably due to the fact that the theoretical exercise of 
attribution of conduct is based on a posteriori reasoning, with the consequent 
difficulty of establishing a priori requirements. This is particularly testified by two 
cases decided by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal that, with reference to the 
period of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, was frequently requested to decide if the 
conduct of private individuals were attributable to the government of Iran. The case 
Hyatt International Corporation v. Iran dealt with the expropriation of goods 
belonging to foreigners by a non-state charitable foundation, the “Foundation for 
the Oppressed”. The tribunal held Iran responsible for the conduct and affirmed that 
the entity was “instrumentally controlled by the Government”74. By contrast, in 
Schering Corporation v. Iran the Tribunal did not consider the activities of a 
“worker’s council” towards the applicant company as attributable to Iran, since the 
                                                        
71 Ibid.; see also J. CRAWFORD, State Responsibility, The General Part, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p. 127.  
72 ARSIWA Commentary, Article 5, para. (6). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., at 94.  
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functions of the entity were confined to represent the interests of workers before 
private corporations.75 
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning a recent case decided in the ambit 
of investor-state arbitration. In EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania the arbitral 
tribunal had to decide upon the attribution of the conduct of two state-controlled 
companies and concluded that the activities were not performed as part of delegated 
governmental authority by virtue of Article 5 ARSIWA, since the activities were 
“performed in pursuit of the corporate object of a commercial company with the 
view to making profits”.76 
Therefore, case law demonstrates that it is not possible to single out specific 
criteria in order to clearly identify a common notion of governmental authority 
under international law. Moreover, we know that the relationship between states 
and separate entities is treated differently among jurisdictions. As a result, the 
evaluation is left to the courts on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, in the absence of a 
defined rule and specified requirements, it is the interpreter that has to look at the 
merits and take into account “all the relevant circumstances”.77  
Another method to identify the content of the activity performed is to look 
into the nature and purpose of such activity. State practice shows that this test is 
often used in order to distinguish acta jure imperii from acta jure gestionis, a 
fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of state immunity.78 In the same 
vein, in the very recent case Naku v. Sweden and Lithuania, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) noted, inter alia, that in order to ascertain the content of 
the activity, it is essential to look into the substance of it and thus the duties of an 
employee at the Swedish embassy in Vilnius were considered only technical and 
based on a private contract regulated by Lithuanian law and not a manifestation of 
Swedish sovereign powers.79 This approach is also reflected in the UN Convention 
                                                        
75 Schering Corporation v. Iran, US-Iran Claims Tribunal Reports 362, at 370. 
76 EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute 
(ICSID) Case No. ARB/05/13, at 197-198.  
77 Trendtex, supra (32), p. 147. 
78 Borri v. Repubblica Argentina, Corte di Cassazione, 2005, in Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale, 2005, p. 1091 
79 Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, ECtHR, 2016, Application No. 26126/07, at 94-95. 
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on Jurisdictional Immunities that refers to both nature and purpose in order to 
determine if an activity carried out by the state is commercial or not.80  
However, the choice to privilege the nature of the activity or its purpose, or 
vice versa, may lead to opposite conclusions. In the Argentine Bonds case, the 
Italian courts, when evaluating the conduct of the Argentinian government, 
concluded in favour of state immunity. The decision was based on the fact that the 
moratorium measures adopted by Argentina corresponded to an exercise of its 
sovereign powers, in relation to the pursued scope.81 This conclusion has been 
criticised by the Italian doctrine, insofar as it did not take into consideration the 
relevant state practice in this ambit, which, instead, seems to suggest a preference 
for the nature of the activity rather than for its purpose. 82  The same Italian 
jurisprudence indicates prevalence for the application of the “nature test”.83 This is 
also the position taken in the UN Convention that opted for the primacy of the 
nature test and the subsidiarity of the purpose.84  
For the scope of this contribution, it is of particular interest to scrutinise how 
state practice tends to prefer the “nature test”, since only when the public nature of 
a conduct is proven is it possible to establish the immunity of the state that put in 
place that conduct.  
The “nature test” becomes particularly difficult with regards to “mixed 
activities”, namely conducts that present prima facie both public and private 
features. Here again the famous Trendtex case can be a good starting point. In that 
                                                        
80 Article 2(2) UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, supra (5). 
81 Borri v. Repubblica Argentina, supra (55), p. 1094. 
82 See e.g. B. I. BONAFÈ, ‘State Immunity and the Protection of Private Investors: the Argentine 
Bonds Case Before Italian Courts’, Italian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XVI, 2006, pp. 165-
185. 
83 Reply received by Italy regarding the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 2001, UN Doc. A/56/291/Add. 1: “Italy considers the ‘nature test’ to be in principle the 
sole criterion for determining the commercial character of a contract or transaction”. See also I. 
PINGEL, ‘Observations sur le convention du 17 janvier 2005 sur les immunités juridictionnelle des 
États et de leurs biens, Journal de Droit International, Vol. 132 No.4, 2005, p. 1048. 
84 Article 2(2) UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their property reads as 
follows: “In determining whether a contract or transaction is a “commercial transaction” under 
paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but 
its purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so 
agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant to determining the 
non-commercial character of the contract or transaction”. 
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case, the Nigerian government ordered (public action) the Central Bank to suspend 
the payment of a supply of cement to private companies (based on a commercial 
transaction). Although the court did not explicitly consider the question of mixed 
activities, it rejected the defence on the basis of immunity without giving relevance 
to the fact that the contractual breach derived from a sovereign act.85 The Czarnikov 
case concerned a supply of sugar that the Polish state-controlled company 
Rolimpex promised to deliver to the English corporation Czarnikov. Before 
Rolimpex had delivered all the sugar, the Polish government imposed a ban on the 
exports after predicting a shortage of sugar due to bad weather. During the appeal, 
the court did not concede state immunity because the company was not an organ of 
the state and Lord Denning affirmed that even if Rolimpex was considered a 
department of the Polish government, the state would have not been granted 
immunity for jurisdiction simply because of its governmental intervention in a 
commercial transaction.86 In other words, in such mixed activity, the governmental 
intervention, a purely public act, would not be relevant for acknowledging the 
nature of the conduct.  
In the similar case of Congreso del Partido, Cuba unilaterally suspended the 
supply of sugar to a Chilean company due to the deteriorated diplomatic relations 
with the then new president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. The central question for 
the court was: “what is one to make of a case where a state has, and in the relevant 
circumstances, clearly displayed, both a commercial interest and a sovereign and 
governmental interest? To which is the critical action to be attributed?”87 In other 
words, how is it possible to identify an exercise of sovereign powers when the 
conduct presents both public and private activity? The Court concluded that 
although the decision to order the ship carrying the sugar not to deliver the rest of 
the cargo to Chile had been taken for political non-commercial reasons (public 
conduct), in this case Cuba acted as the owner of the ship (private conduct) and 
therefore was not entitled to immunity.88  
                                                        
85 Trendtex, supra (32), p. 111. 
86 C. Czarnikov Ltd. v. Rolimpex, England Court of Appeal, 1977 and House of Lords, 1978, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 64, p. 195. 
87 Congreso del Partido, House of Lords, 1981, International Law Reports, Vol. 64, p. 316. 
88 Ibid. 
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The question of mixed activities was also considered by Swiss courts in 
Banque Central de la République de Turquie in which the Central Bank of Turkey 
was acting as an intermediary between an English bank and a Turkish bank for the 
repayment of a loan. The court did not grant immunity to the central bank insofar 
as the “the difficult distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
was to be made not accordingly to their purpose but accordingly to the nature of the 
legal relationship”.89 In other words, it is the nature of the link between the state 
and the individual that is indicative of the essence of the activity and therefore 
decisive in the evaluation of state immunity. 
The nature of the legal relationship, between the state and the private 
individual to whom the activity is delegated, appears of critical importance vis-à-
vis immunity. The focus on such relationship excludes any form of automatic 
extension of the applicability of the institution. Indeed, the delegation of an activity 
by the state does not constitutes a reason in itself for vesting the delegated 
individual with the immunity proper of the state. The nature of the subject, 
parameter emerged along with the old conceptualization of the absolute immunity 
of sovereign states, is ill-suited to govern the cases explored here as it extends the 
application of immunity either too much or not enough. The same is true for the 
evaluation of the scope, especially in the evaluation of the “mixed activities”. Thus, 
the judgement should focus on the nature of the act delegating the activity and on 
the nature of the relation between the state and the individual. This judgement 
cannot be made in a generalized fashion, but requires a factual and punctual 
assessment on a case by case basis. 
 
5. The issue of limiting the immunity of delegated non state actors   
 
 
As shown in this analysis, the emergence of non-state actors at the 
international level poses issues of coordination between the activities performed by 
                                                        
89  Banque Central de la République de Turquie v. Weston Compagnie de Finance et 
d’Investissement SA and Another, Switzerland Federal Tribunal, 1978, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 64, p. 417.  
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these entities and public international law norms. In particular, the central question 
is whether or not a norm of classic international law, as in the case of state 
immunity, can or should be automatically extended to non-state actors when they 
are authorised to perform public functions.  
A peculiar aspect proper of the law of immunity, that is important to take 
into account in the analysis of this matter, is that the discipline of immunity is driven 
by courts.90 Unlike other aspects of international law, in the determination of the 
law of immunity a crucial role is played not much by the governments of states, 
their executive branches, or NGOs as much as it is done by the judiciary. In many 
cases, NGOs plays an important part in motivating victims to bring their claims to 
court as well as in providing them legal counsel, but the issues at stake are 
ultimately dealt by courts. 
Provided that immunity is one of the most classic legal institutions proper 
of international law, it is surprising to observe the limited role played by 
international courts or tribunals on the matter. It is only recently that the ECtHR 
and the ICJ began to address a number of cases concerning immunity. The ECtHR 
developed a limited case-law on the issue of immunity. Particularly relevant is the 
case-law developed on employment disputes raising the question of immunity of 
international organizations, which has been heavily relied upon by national courts 
of both members to the ECHR and other European countries. 91  Besides this 
fortunate case-law, a couple of judgements of the ECtHR have been the object of a 
horizontal interaction with the ICJ, 92  which was respectively cited “as 
authoritative” by the ECtHR.93 
However, beside this limited and only recently developed role assumed by 
the two aforementioned international courts, the discipline of state immunity is 
primarily a matter of domestic courts. Given the customary nature of the law of 
                                                        
90 PETERS, “Immune Against Constitutionalisation?”, p. 6. 
91 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy, Appl. No. 26083/94, judgment of 18 February 1999. 
92 ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), application No. 35763/97, judgment of 
21 November 2001, ECHR Reports 2001-xi, p. 101, and Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and 
Germany, Application No. 59021/00, decision of 12 December 2002, ECHR Reports 2002-x, p. 417, 
quoted in ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n.3), para. 90. 
93 ECtHR, Jones and others v. uk, appl. nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, judgment of 14 Jan. 2014, 
para. 197. 
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state immunity,94 national courts considerably rely on foreign cases for the decision 
of the issue at hand.95 This pattern appears quite unusual in international law, and 
this is arguably due to the fact that immunity becomes a question when a 
controversy is brought before a national court. Thus, as pointed out by some 
scholars,96 domestic case-law becomes relevant in the development of international 
law of immunities under at least three aspects. First, domestic judgements may 
develop state practices and/or be pronouncements of opinio iuris, therefore 
constituting the basis of an international customary law.97 Second, domestic court 
decisions may amount to “subsequent practice” for the interpretation of treaty law 
– in the sense of Art. 31(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – 
as well as for the “interpretation” of international customary rules. Third, pursuant 
to Art. 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, domestic “judicial decisions” constitute a 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.  
Hence, given the paramount role that national judicial decisions play in the 
determination and development of the international law of state immunity, it 
appears that domestic courts are, indeed, the principal arenas where the issue of the 
extension of immunity has to be addressed  
The relevance of this point can be illustrated through a case decided by the 
Tribunal of Genoa, Italy in 2012. 98  The case concerned the activity of naval 
classification societies, namely private corporations to which flag states delegate 
the technical surveys required to assess the seaworthiness of ships. In February 
2006, after a technical failure, a Panama-registered vessel sank in the Red Sea, 
                                                        
94 As emerged from a study conducted more than two decades ago, relative state immunity was a 
rule of international customary law formed through the convergence of state practice and opinio 
iuris since the late 1970s; see Y I. PINGEL-LENUZZA, Les immunités des Etats en droit international, 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997, pp. 4-11. 
95 See YANG, State Immunity, p. 4, when explaining the practice of national courts to rely on foreign 
cases the author states that “such references constitute a persistent feature in cases of State 
immunity”. 
96 See, among others, A. ROBERTS, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts 
in Creating and Enforcing International law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, No. 
60, pp. 62-63. 
97  See YANG E. KADENS, E.A. YOUNG, “How Customary is Customary International Law?”, 
William & Mary Law Review, 2013, Vol. 54, No. 3, p. 885. 
98 Abdel Naby Hussein Mabrouk Aly and others v. Rina s.p.a., sentenza Tribunale di Genova, 12 
March 2012. 
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causing the death of more than 1,000 people. After the incident, the victims’ 
relatives initiated a legal action against the classification society – based in Italy - 
responsible for the technical checks and entrusted by the Panamian maritime 
administration to carry out the relative surveys. The Italian judges concluded in 
favour of the classification society, declaring that the company had the right to be 
granted immunity from the Italian jurisdiction on the ground that, for the activities 
considered, it acted on behalf of a foreign state, Panama, being delegated by it.  
Although it is not possible here to discuss the numerous legal questions that 
led to that decision, this case shows how the tribunal extended the application of a 
norm of public international law, originally meant for states as primary addressees, 
– to a private actor. This approach has three main direct consequences: (1) the risk 
of substantially jeopardising the legal protection of the subjects suffering the 
wrongful conduct; (2) an increased difficulty in exercising an effective judicial 
control on the activities performed by non-state actors; and (3) more generally, the 
risk of generating incoherence in the application and interpretation of public 
international law norms.  
The controversy was raised again before the Tribunal of Genoa, which in 
September 2018 lodged a request for a preliminary ruling of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in order to assess whether the activities of the naval certification 
societies are to be qualified as administrative matters or as civil and commercial.99 
The qualification of the matter at hand requested by the Italian Tribunal has a 
double implication. On the one hand, if the activities of the certification societies 
are deemed as civil or commercial matters, the Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 would 
                                                        
99  More precisely, the Italian Tribunal in the request for preliminary ruling (Case C-641/18) 
questions whether “articles 1(1) and 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
[should] be interpreted — particularly in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and recital 16 of 
Directive 2009/15/EC — as preventing a court of a Member State from waiving its jurisdiction by 
granting jurisdictional immunity to private entities and legal persons carrying out classification 
and/or certification activities, established in that Member State, in respect of the performance of 
those classification and/or certification activities on behalf of a non-EU State, in a dispute 
concerning compensation for death and personal injury caused by the sinking of a passenger ferry 
and liability for negligent conduct.” 
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find application to the case establishing the jusrisdiction of the Italian judge.100 On 
the other hand, if the matter is qualified as administrative, the abovementioned 
Regulation would not find application and the jursdiction of the Italian judge will 
be waived by granting jurisdictional immunity to the classification societies.  
Hence, the grant of immunity to the non-state actors is dependent on the 
qualification of their activities delegated by the Panamian state as “administrative”, 
i.e. expression of governmental authority, or as “civil and commercial matters” 
falling in the category of acta iure gestionis. The notion of “civil and commercial 
matters” of the Regulation has been understood by the Court as authonous, and to 
be interpreted in the light of the general principles common to the national legal 
systems and of the Regulation itself.101 The extension of such notion to a specific 
case is determined by the elements characterizing the type of legal relations 
between the actors involved.102  In the case at hand, the nature of the relation 
between the Panamian state and the classification societies might be considered 
differently depending on whether the societies were performing classification or a 
certification activities.103 
In order to avoid the automatic application of a norm of public international 
law to a subject that is not directly considered as part of this normative system, a 
solution may consist in the establishment of a presumption of non-applicability, that 
should be applied by national courts.  
In other words, it is possible to suggest that when legal practitioners face the 
question of whether or not applying a norm of public international law to non-state 
                                                        
100  The Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 establishes the jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In particular, art. 1(1) and 2(1) provide 
respectively that:  
“This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or 
tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters;” 
“Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, 
be sued in the courts of that Member State.” 
101 See the ECJ judgement of 15 November 2018, C-308/17, Kuhn, EU:C:2018:91, §32. 
102 On the nature of this determination see the ECJ judgement of 12 September 2013, C-49/12, 
Sunico, EU:C:2013:545, § 33. 
103 On the relevance of the distinction between classification and certification activities for the 
extension of immunity to delegated non state actors see V. ULFBECK and A. MOLLMANN, and “Public 
Function Liability of Classification Societies”, in P. ROTT (ed.) Certification – Trust, Accountability, 
Liability, Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, Springer, 2019. 
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actors, they should start with the assumption that these entities are per se not entitled 
to enjoy public international law norms. This is not to say that the ultimate result 
would exclude the application of the norm in every case. Rather, a careful 
consideration of all the relevant factual circumstances may deny or confirm the 
suitability of such application. 
In civil procedure, the concept of presumption has a definite meaning. In 
particular, it is a rule according to which given a certain fact – known as primary 
fact – then another fact – the presumed fact – will also be taken as proved, unless 
evidence is provided by the opponent to rebut the presumption or contradict the 
presumed fact.104 For instance, it is considered as a general presumption that all 
documents, whether ancient or modern, whether formal or informal, were drafted 
on the date written on the document.105 According to another common law rule, a 
person who has disappeared and no one has heard from for seven years by those 
most likely to have heard from him is presumed dead.106 In the same vein, the Italian 
Civil Code provides, for instance, that if the current owner has owned the same 
object in the past, it is presumed that he has also been the owner in the intermediate 
period.107 These are all examples of a particular form of presumption, namely the 
presumption juris tantum, according to which the primary fact shifts the burden of 
proof of the presumed fact to the respondent who must provide evidence to disprove 
it.108 The three main characteristics of this presumptions are: (1) they derive from 
law, (2) they apply to a class a set of conditions which are fixed and uniform, (3) 
they are drawn by court, and in the absence of opposing evidence they are 
conclusive for the party in whose favour they operate.109 
Indeed, it is necessary to establish which facts can be referred to when a 
court has to decide whether or not a non-state actor can be considered to be acting 
as a state and therefore entitled to enjoy public international law immunity. 
                                                        
104 P. MURPHY, Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997, p. 94. 
105 Anderson v. Weston (1840) 6 Bing. N.C. 296, 300-306, as reported in M. N. HOWARD and others, 
Phipson on Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990, p. 93.  
106 Bullock v. Bullock (1960) 1 WLR 975.  
107 Article 1142, Italian Civil Code reads as follows (Italian version): “Il possessore attuale che ha 
posseduto in tempo più remoto si presume che abbia posseduto anche nel tempo intermedio”.  
108 F. P. LUISO, Diritto Processuale Civile, Vol. II, Giuffrè, 2015, p. 86.  
109 M. N. HOWARD and others, supra (69), p. 84. 
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According to this reasoning, for the purpose of the application of international law, 
a private entity shall be presumed not to be an integral part of the state – or a state 
organ - even when it exercises elements of public authority. As a result, the 
responding private actor must provide evidence that it is in fact acting as an organ 
of the state, exercising elements of the governmental power delegated by the latter. 
This method would guarantee that only when precise factual circumstances are 
proved, the court should operate the extension of a public international law norm to 
a non-state actor. This approach seems to be confirmed by the above-mentioned 
UK State Immunity Act that, for the purpose of the application of state immunity, 
does not include separate entities in the notion of a state, even if they exercise public 
authority.110 Also the case law analysed in the previous paragraphs shows how 
courts tend to primarily reason on the status of the entity and only when the entity 
is considered to be an integral part of the state do they turn to evaluate the features 
of the activity involved. In this sense, it may be recalled that in the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, German courts affirmed that independent separate entities in principle 
enjoy “no immunity”.111  
This restrictive approach to the extension of immunity appears to be adopted 
by the EU as well. With regard to the protection of the activities conducted by naval 
classification societies delegated by states, Recital 16 of Directive 2009/15/EC 
adopts a restrictive approach in the extension of immunity to the delegated non-
state actors. It explicitly excludes the possibility of extension of immunity, “which 
is a prerogative that can only be invoked by Member States as an inseparable right 
of sovereignty and therefore that cannot be delegated”.112  
Doubts on the validity of Recital 16 might be raised in the case concerning 
the responsibility of the naval classification societies on the ground that it has not 
                                                        
110 Section 14 UK State Immunity Act, supra (34). 
111 Central Bank of Nigeria Case, Landgericht of Frankfurt, supra (36), p. 134 
112 In providing common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for 
the relevant activities of maritime administrations, Recital 16 of Directive 2009/15/EC states that: 
“When a recognised organisation, its inspectors, or its technical staff issue the relevant certificates 
on behalf of the administration, Member States should consider enabling them, as regards these 
delegated activities, to be subject to proportionate legal safeguards and judicial protection, including 
the exercise of appropriate rights of defence, apart from immunity, which is a prerogative that can 
only be invoked by Member States as an inseparable right of sovereignty and therefore that cannot 
be delegated”. 
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been transposed in the relevant national legislation, i.e. the Italian legal system. 
However, the role of recitals is not to set forth a normative precept, but to state the 
act’s validity and to provide for the principles essential for interpreting the 
normative content of the act.113  The ECJ has repeatedly expressed itself on the 
matter stating that the recital may resolve the ambiguity where the operative 
provision is not clear,114 and that it can help to explain the purpose and intent behind 
the legal instrument, determining the scope of the act.115 Hence, the function of a 
recital is not to provide for a normative provision itself but to explicit the purposes 
and the scope of the entire act. 116  It follows that the material and punctual 
transposition of the single recital in a national provision is irrelevant for its 
applicability, and that the Directive 2009/15/EC – in its transposition in the Italian 
legal system – is to be read in the light of the restrictive approach to the extension 
of immunity stated in its Recital 16.117 
Thus, immunity is a prerogative proper of sovereign states that in order to 
be extended to a non-state actor would require to prove its exercise of governmental 
power as delegated by the state. In other words, the main focus is on the nature of 
the link between the state and the entity. In fact, it would be too burdensome for 
any party other than the private actor to prove this link; therefore, it is the party that 
seeks to resort to international law that has to prove such relationship. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
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As seen, state courts are looking for a proper guidance in order to avoid the 
dangers of an automatic extension of immunity to non-state actors.  
In the context of the new picture of international law that has been canvassed 
there are good reasons for applying a presumption of non-applicability of state 
immunity to non state-actors delegated to the exercise of public authority. 
The first reason has to do with the effectiveness of the “rule of law”. Indeed, 
from the perspective of classical international law states are understood as a unitary 
entity with a uniform legal opinion. This conviction is a by-product of the principle 
of the rule of law that requires states to be organized pursuant to the principle of 
separation of powers, with the judiciary branch completely separated from the 
executive. However, this separation is sometimes not as neat as it is supposed to be. 
This separation might become particularly blurred in cases concerning state 
immunity, where there is a “tendency of some courts to defer to the assessment of 
the executive branch when deciding whether to grant immunity or not”118. In these 
cases there is an actual risk that the assessment made by the executive is based more 
on foreign policy considerations rather than considerations derived from the rule of 
law principle, with the risk of provoking an effect of judicial self-restraint. The 
introduction of the presumption of non-applicability would limit the effects of such 
self-restraint to the extent that, regardless of the relevance of the private actors 
involved, immunity will not operate unless proven in court. 
From a second perspective, the presumption of non-applicability is coherent 
with the idea that the publicness of international law should be preserved: indeed 
the element of “publicness” that might be present in the facts of a hypothetic case 
would need to be identified and proven in the proceeding. Moreover, considering 
that we are dealing with cases where state immunity might be extended to private 
actors, the presumption appears essential to enable a pondered adaptation of an 
institution of classic public international law to the mutating international legal 
order. As said, in the evolution from absolute to relative immunity, with the 
distinction between acts iure imperii and iure gestionis, the legal institution remains 
strongly anchored to the state as the subject of the act. Hence, an automatic 
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application of immunity to non-state actors would be alien to the logic underpinning 
the institution. In fact, it would denature its function, with the risk to produce effects 
that go beyond, or are even incompatible, with its rationale. Instead of granting 
stability of international relations and inter-state cooperation, this extension of 
immunity carries along the potential effect of granting privileges to private entities 
that are unjustified in the international legal order.119 Furthermore, the presumption 
of non-applicability is coherent with the changing image of international law 
characterized by the emergence of phenomena of private governance. The 
increasing heterogeneity of actors along with the new structure that international 
law is assuming requires a careful adaptation of the classical institutions developed 
within the Westphalian paradigm of international law, preventing any automatic 
application of the classic institutions to the new context and to new subjects therein.  
A third reason has to do with the nature element. If the automatic application 
of immunity to an exercise of public authority by the state is justified by the nature 
of the state, it follows that whenever the public authority is delegated to a non-state 
actor it is no longer automatically covered by the nature-derived immunity. On the 
contrary, it would require an evaluation of the imperative character of the act that 
will need to be proven genuinely governmental. Such character cannot be assumed 
when the actor is not a state and imposes a factual and punctual analysis of the case 
in order to evaluate the possibility to extend the immunity to the delegated subject. 
A fourth and last aspect is worth of consideration. An automatic extension 
of immunity to private subjects appears highly incoherent with the development 
that international public law has undergone in the recent decades. Indeed, the efforts 
of constitutionalization and democratization of the international legal system,120 
with the objective of enhancing legitimacy and the effective application of human 
rights, seems to go in the opposite direction. As argued by Trindade Cançado, the 
expansion of international law came along with the abandonment of Hegelian and 
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neo-Hegelian conceptions of the state, as the final repository of individual freedoms 
and responsibilities, towards a more humanized dimension of public international 
law.121 Such an easy extension of immunity to private actors would frustrate not 
only the work undertaken so far in the direction to render accountability effective 
when it comes to human rights violation, but also the very legitimacy of the 
institutions of immunity itself. Indeed the extension of this traditional elements of 
international law should be carefully limited to its westphalian assumptions and 
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